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Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2915
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 12002

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E.O.11652:XGDS-3
TAGS: PARM US UK UR
SUBJECT: CTB NEGOTIATIONS: US AND UK COMMENTS ON
SOVIET NSS TEXT

CTB MESSAGE NO.285

1. SUMMARY: AT NSS WORKING GROUP MEETING AUGUST 3, US AND UK DELS COMMENTED ON SOVIET DRAFT ARTICLE AND ANNEX, POINTING OUT AREAS OF AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT. TARASOV (USSR) SAID THE COMMENTS WERE INTERESTING, AND THAT HE WOULD RESPOND NEXT WEEK TO QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE US AND UK DELS. END SUMMARY.

2. AT AUGUST 3 NSS WORKING GROUP MEETING, FINCH (US) AND FAKLEY (UK) COMMENTED ON SOVIET DEL'S DRAFT NSS ARTICLE AND ANNEX, OUTLINING AREAS OF AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT AS FOLLOWS.

3. CHARACTERIZATION OF THE NSS PROVISIONS: WE COULD
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AGREE WITH THE SOVIET DEL'S PROPOSAL TO CHARACTERIZE THE NSS PROVISIONS IN TERMS OF AN EXCHANGE OF ADDITIONAL SEISMIC DATA FROM STATIONS NEAR LOCATIONS SPECIFIED IN THE ANNEX, ALTHOUGH WE WOULD DESIRE A SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT DESCRIPTION OF THE EXCHANGE PROCESS. THE THREE DELS WERE ALSO APPARENTLY IN AGREEMENT THAT IT MIGHT BE DESIRABLE FOR A GENERAL ARTICLE, APPLYING TO ALL VERIFICATION

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EQUIPMENT, TO RESTRICT SUCH EQUIPMENT TO SUPPLYING DATA USEFUL FOR VERIFICATION OF THE TEST BAN TREATY AND PROTOCOL. BUT FINCH NOTED THAT THE PRECISE LANGUAGE THAT THE US DEL HAD PROPOSED IN MAY HAD BEEN CAREFULLY SELECTED SO THAT DATA OBTAINED FROM THIS EQUIPMENT COULD ALSO BE USED FOR LEGITIMATE RESEARCH PURPOSES.

4. PHASING IN NSS EQUIPMENT, AND COMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURES. WE COULD AGREE TO A STEP-BY-STEP PROCESS FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EXCHANGE, BUT WE PREFERRED TO THINK OF THIS PROCESS AS PHASING IN IMPROVED EQUIPMENT RATHER THAN IN TERMS OF TWO STAGES OF THE AGREEMENT. WE COULD AGREE THAT THE FIRST PHASE WOULD INVOLVE THE EXCHANGE OF SEISMIC DATA IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURES OF THE INTERNATIONAL SEISMIC DATA EXCHANGE. WE BELIEVED, HOWEVER, THAT THE IMPROVED NSS EQUIPMENT SHOULD BE INSTALLED AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE, BECAUSE IN OUR VIEW IT IS THE EXCHANGE OF CONTINUOUS DATA FROM THE IMPROVED EQUIPMENT WHICH WOULD CONTRIBUTE THE MOST TO ENHANCING CONFIDENCE IN COMPLIANCE AND STRENGTHENING THE TREATY REGIME. FINCH SAID THAT THE US DEL BELIEVED THAT THERE WAS A NEED FOR AGREEING ON SOME TARGET DATES; WE HAVE PROPOSED THAT IMPROVED EQUIPMENT BE INSTALLED WITHIN TWO YEARS AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE. IN ADDITION, WE PREFERRED TO EXCHANGE THE DATA VIA SATELLITE RATHER THAN BY USING TAPES. AT A LATER POINT IN THE MEETING, TARASOV (USSR) INTERJECTED HIS REMARK RELATING THE SOVIET

UNION'S RELUCTANCE TO ACCEPT SATELLITE COMMUNICATION TO THE LIMITED, SHORT DURATION OF THE TREATY, AND TO THE UNCERTAINTY ABOUT ITS REPLACEMENT (SEE CTB 284). FINCH REPLIED THAT THE SOVIET UNION NEED NOT BE CONCERNED ABOUT WASTING AN INVESTMENT IN INTELSAT TRANSMITTING FACILITIES, BECAUSE IT COULD ENTER INTO A LONG-TERM CONTRACT WITH INTELSAT INDEPENDENTLY OF THE TREATY AND UNRELATED TO ITS DURATION. FINCH SUGGESTED THAT THE DELEGATIONS HOLD A LATER TECHNICAL MEETING TO DISCUSS THE RELATIVE MERITS OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS AND TAPE EXCHANGES. TARASOV SAID THAT SUCH A DISCUSSION WOULD NOT BE VERY INTERESTING, AND THAT VERIFICATION MEASURES MUST NOT BE EXCESSIVELY BURDENSOME.

5. EQUIPMENT CHARACTERISTICS. FINCH SAID THAT WE CONTINUED TO BELIEVE THAT THE AGREEMENT OR ANNEX SHOULD SET FORTH THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SEISMIC EQUIPMENT RATHER THAN DEFER THESE ISSUES FOR AGREEMENT DURING THE LIFE OF THE TREATY.

6. INSTALLATION AND MAINTENANCE. FAKLEY, SUPPORTED BY FINCH, SAID THAT WE WOULD WANT THE AGREEMENT OR ANNEX TO

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SPECIFY INSTALLATION AND MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES.

7. AUTHENTICATION. FINCH SAID THAT THERE WAS AGREEMENT THAT THERE SHOULD BE AN AUTHENTICATION DEVICE. WE BELIEVED THAT ITS CHARACTERISTICS SHOULD BE AGREED IN THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS AND DESCRIBED IN A GENERAL WAY IN THE ANNEX.

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8. TIME SCHEDULE FOR IMPLEMENTATION. FINCH REMINDED TARASOV THAT THE US AND UK DELS PROPOSE THAT TARGET DATES BE SET IN THE AGREEMENT ITSELF RATHER THAN DEFERRED, ALTHOUGH JCC COULD WORK OUT A DETAILED TIME TABLE WITHIN THE AGREED SCHEDULE OF TARGET DATES.

9. UK PARTICIPATION. WE CONTINUE TO THINK THAT NSS ARE NOT NEEDED IN THE UK.

10. SITE SELECTION. FAKLEY SAID THAT THE AGREEMENT OR ANNEX SHOULD DEFINE THE EXTENT OF AREA WITHIN WHICH A STATION SHOULD BE LOCATED.

11. TARASOV CHARACTERIZED THE US AND UK COMMENTS AS INTERESTING. HE THOUGHT THAT SEVERAL PARAS OF THE TEXT COULD BE AGREED UPON EASILY, BUT RECOGNIZED SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES WITH RESPECT TO SOME IMPORTANT ISSUES. HE NOTED THAT SOME OF THE US AND UK COMMENTS INCLUDED SOME

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QUESTIONS REGARDING DETAILS OF THE SOVIET DEL'S TEXT,
AND SAID THAT HE WOULD ANSWER THESE QUESTIONS NEXT WEEK.
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12. IN INFORMAL CONVERSATION AFTER THE MEETING, NOVIKOV (USSR) DESCRIBED THE SOVIET POSITION ON SEVERAL POINTS TO FAKLEY AND THREE US DELOFFS. HE WAS ASKED WHETHER A NEW STATION WITH IMPROVED EQUIPMENT COULD BE CONSTRUCTED, DURING THE SECOND STAGE, NEAR A LOCATION AGREED IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS BUT WHERE NO EXISTING STATION WAS CURRENTLY SITUATED. HE SAID THAT THIS ISSUE WAS "SUBJECT TO DISCUSSION." HE WAS ASKED WHY PARA 3(B) OF THE SOVIET TEXT REFERS NOT ONLY TO AN EXCHANGE OF CONTINUOUS DATA IN THE SECOND STAGE BUT ALSO TO AN EXCHANGE "IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURES ESTABLISHED FOR THE INITIAL STAGE." HE POINTED OUT THAT WHAT THE CCD EXPERTS CALL "LEVEL ONE DATA" WILL ARRIVE AHEAD OF THE MAGNETIC TAPES, AND THE PARTIES MIGHT THEREFORE WANT BOTH SYSTEMS OF EXCHANGE TO OPERATE SIMULTANEOUSLY. HE CONFIRMED THAT CONTINUOUS DATA, UNDER THE SOVIET PROPOSAL, MEANT AN EXCHANGE OF ALL OF THE DATA, WITHOUT INTERRUPTION, INCLUDING ALL NOISE AND MICROSEISMS. FINALLY, HE EXPLAINED (SEE CTB 284) THAT TARASOV'S REFERENCES JULY 25 TO "OTHER ISSUES" SEEN AS RELATED TO THE QUESTION OF SPECIFYING DETAILED CHARACTERISTICS IN THE AGREEMENT PERTAINED TO TREATY DURATION, AND TO NUMBERS AND LOCATIONS OF STATIONS. JOHNSON

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